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waiver opportunities to narrowly defined groups, such as the current

Pennsylvania law. Only after such action can each member of the public
be assured of protection.
SANDRA

R. JOHNSON

Securities Regulation- Glenn Turner: Closer to Economic Realities
A transaction comes within the purview of the federal securities
laws' only if it can be brought within one or more of the terms listed in
the statutory definition of a security! The traditional test enunciated by
the Supreme Court3 for one of these terms, the "investment contract,"
has been criticized by some state courts4 and by several commentators.5
Such criticism, however, was absent in the federal court opinions when
the Oregon federal district court, in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter'Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. k§ 78a-z (1970).
-Securities Act of 1933, § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b)(1) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 3 (a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a)(10) (1970). Section 77 (b)(1) reads:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferrable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any
interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," . . . .
Securities Act of 1933, § 2 (I), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (b)(1) (1970).
The delinition in the 1933 Act is "virtually identical to that contained in the 1934 Act."
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
If the transaction alleged to be a security does not fall within one of the specific categories
delineated in the definition, reference should be made to the more general classifications. SEC v.
C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943).
3SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
'See. e.g., Florida Discount Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969). afrd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1970); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 485
P.2d 105 (1971); cf. Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 186 (1961); State v. Silbergerg, 166 Ohio St. 101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956).
sSee. e.g., Augustine & Hrusoff, Franchise Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347 (1970); Coffey,
The Economic Realities of a "Security"': Is There a-More Meaning/id Formula, 18 W. Rus. L.
REV. 367 (1967). Coleman, A Franchise Agreement: Not a "Security" Under the Securities /let
of 1933, 22 Bus. LAW. 493 (1967); Goodwin, Franchising in the Economy: The Franchise Agreenent as a Security Under Securities Acts. Incuding lOb-5 Considerations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311
(1969): Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities
Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (1971). Franchise Symposium: Franchising as a Security 33
OHIo ST. L.J. 718 (1972); Note, Pyramid Schemes: Dare to Be Regulated, 61 GEo. L.J. 1257
(1973).
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prises, Inc.,' modified the qualification in the traditional test requiring

that profits from an investment contract "come solely from the efforts
of others."'7 The Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision and will now find

an investment contract in spite of investor participation if the investor
efforts are not "those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."" The purpose of this note is to determine whether the test should have been changed at all, and if so, whether
the Glenn Turner modification is a good one.
The Glenn Turner court was confronted with the pyramid sales
scheme of Dare to Be Great, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenn

W. Turner Enterprises, Inc. Ostensibly Dare sold through four "adventures" and one "plan" a motivation training course consisting of printed

materials, tape recordings, and group instruction. The most important
feature of two of the "adventures" and of the "plan," however, was the

right granted to the purchaser to help sell the motivational courses to
others. A handsome commission was the reward for a successful sale
In spite of his technical role as a salesman, the investor's duties and
responsibilities were somewhat limited; 10 his task was to induce prospective purchasers or "prospects" to attend meetings and weekend Golden

Opportunity Tours during which his selling effort was secondary to that
of the Dare "people."" The general tone of the meetings and tours was

reminiscent of revival meetings, and the element of high pressure, hardsell salesmanship was never absent. 12 In affirming the District Court's

holding that the transactions of Dare were investment contracts, 13 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found (1) an investment of
6348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ore. 1972), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42
U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. October 9, 1973).
'SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
'SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3194 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1973).
11d. at 477-80. "The major emphasis . . . is on the opportunities for earning money by
purchasing Adventure 4." 348 F. Supp. at 770.
"1474 F.2d at 478-80. For example, salesmen were instructed not to explain to prospective
purchasers what they were selling. 348 F. Supp. at 770.
"474 F.2d at 479. At each meeting, after the speakers had finished, the purchaser-salesman
would attempt to convince his prospect to buy. Often "agents of defendants who are specialists at
the required techniques of psychological hard-sell take over and accomplish the sale." 348 F. Supp.
at 770.
"2474 F.2d at 479-80.
"The district court held that the transactions of Dare were securites under three separate
parts of the statutory definition, first, "a certificate of interest or participation in amy profit-sharing
agreement," secondly, "investment contract," and, finally, any "instrument commonly known as
a 'security."' 348 F. Supp. at 773-76.
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money, (2) a common enterprise, and (3) an expectation of profits to
come from the efforts of others. The court was troubled by the language
in the traditional test that profits come solely from the efforts of others." The court, however, adopted a more flexible approach and held,
[I]n light of the remedial nature of the legislation, the statutory policy
of affording broad protection to the public, and the Supreme Court's
admonitions that the definition of securities should be a flexible one,
the word "solely" should not be read as a strict or literal limitation
on the definition of an investment contract, but rather must be construed realistically, so as to include within the definition those schemes
which involve in substance, if not form, securities.' 5
The test thus adopted was "whether the efforts made by those other than
the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise."'"
In applying the definitional provisions of the securities acts, the
Supreme Court has employed two broad policies which are set forth in
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp."7 and Tcherepnin v. Knight." In
Joiner,the term "investment contract" was held to include the offer and
sale of assignments of oil leases when the transaction also involved the
drilling of a test well "so located as to test the oil-producing possibilities
of the offered leaseholds."' 19 Joiner had argued that, notwithstanding its
remedial nature, the Securities Act should be construed strictly, since
its violation is a crime. The Court answered, "Though penal laws are
to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to
defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. ' 2 Moreover, in explain"474 F.2d at 481-82.
11id. at 482.
"Id. The district court's phrasing of the test is similar, but is set in terms of the relevancy of
the efforts. "inapplying the Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract. . .the efforts
of others which are relevant for purposes of the definition are those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." 348 F. Supp. at 775.
7320 U.S. 344 (1943).
"389 U.S. 332 (1967).
"1320 U.S. at 346. "The exploration enterprise was woven into these leaseholds, in both an
economic and a legal sense; the undertaking to drill a well runs through the whole transaction as
the thread on which everybody's beads were strung." Id. at 348. Furthermore, the fraud found by
the trial court, though not material to the question of security vel non, involved the location of the
leased properties in respect to the test well. Id. at 347 n.4.
-'Id. at 354. Legislative intent as expressed by the 1933 Act is "[T]o provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the
mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities Act of 1933,
ch. 38, Preamble, 48 Stat. 74. In addition, House of Respresentatives' Report No. 85 states that
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ing the proper construction of the terms in section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 2'
the Court emphasized that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the
22
obvious and commonplace.

In Tcherepnin, the Court found a withdrawable capital share in an
Illinois savings and loan association to be a security under the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934.23 Pointing out that remedial legislation, such as

the 1934 Act, "should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes, '2 4

the Court continued, "One of the Act's central purposes is to protect
investors through the requirement of full disclosure by issuers of securi-

ties. .... "25 Furthermore, in striving to determine the meaning of the
word "security" for the purposes of the securities laws "form should be
disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic

reality."

'2

The leading case defining an "investment contract" is SEC v. W.J.

Howey Co. 2 1 Two transactions were involved in Howey: first, the sale
of Florida orange grove acreage and, secondly, the sale of service contracts for the cultivation of the purchased property.28 Noting that the
investors were by and large non-resident professional people, 2 Justice
Murphy, speaking for the Court, found that the transactions were securities.3 " Though the term "investment contract" was undefined by the
one of the aims of the 1933 legislation is "that the persons, whether they be directors, experts, or
underwriters, who sponsor the investment of other people's money should be held up to the high
standards of trusteeship." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1933).
2-See note 2 supra.
2320 U.S. at 351.
Novel, uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever they appear to be, are also reached if
it be proved as a matter of fact that they are widely offered or dealt in under terms or
courses of dealing which established their character in commerce as "investment contracts," or as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security'."
Id.
'389 U.S. at 345.
211d. at 336.
2Id.
251d.
-328 U.S. 293 (1946).
"'Id.at 295. The W.J. Howey Company sold the land, and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc.
cultivated and cared for the acreage thus sold, if such services were desired by the purchaser. Both
corporations, however, shared the same offices, utilized the same personnel, and were under direct
common control. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 60 F. Supp. 440, 441 (S.D. Fla. 1945).
"328 U.S. at 296. These investors did not possess the requisite skills or equipment for the care
and cultivation of citrus groves. "They [were] attracted by the expectation of substantial profits."
Id.
"Id. at 299.
Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here. The
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1*933 Act, he determined that at the time of the enactment, the meaning
had been crystallized by state court decisions under the "blue sky"
laws.3 ' It was "therefore reasonable to attach that meaning to the term
as used by Congress, especially since such a definition is consistent with
the statutory aims. ' 3 The meaning thus derived was stated as follows:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means
a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money
in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the
efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether
the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by
33
nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 4 though agreeing with
the SEC that securities law coverage extended to established businesses,
had viewed the non-speculative character of the Howey enterprises as
controlling.3 5 This evaluation of the risk of the particular enterprise was
viewed as apposite to the determination of "the critical question,
whether in fact the purchase was of a specific thing having specific value
in itself or was of a thing having no value unless the enterprise as a whole
should succeed." 36 The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach
saying, "[I]t is immaterial whether the enterprise is speculative or nonspeculative or whether there is a sale of property with or without intrinsic value. . . . The statutory policy of affording broad protection to
investors is not to be thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formu37
la e . ,
investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the promoters manage, control and operate the enterprise. It follows that the arrangements whereby the
investors' interests are made manifest involve investment contracts, regardless of the
legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed.
Id. at 300.
"Id. at 298. See. e.g., State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937
(1920). where the court, finding a security under the state law, said, "The placing of capital or A
laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment is an
'investment' as that word is commonly known and understood." Id. at 56, 177 N.W. at 938. The

North Carolina Supreme Court applied the above quoted statement from State v. Gopher Tire &
Rubber Co. in State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 153 S.E. 855 (1930), and found no security saying,
"[The investor] was to get his income from the gross amount received for his individual service
.- Id. at 139, 153 S.E. at 858.
-293 U.S. at 298.
"Id. at 298-99.
'SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1945).
111d. at 717. "But it may not be doubted that in close cases, like Joiner's was, the fact that
an activity is purely promotional and speculative does have weight.
Id.
3
GId.
:n293 U.S. at 301.
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The Howey test has been applied without deviation by many federal

courts to varying situations: brokerage discretionary accounts,38 fran-

40
chise agreements, 39 contracts for the purchase and raising of beaver,
and distributorship agreements. 4
In State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,42 the Hawaiian court determined that the transactions of a corporation employing a pryamid-sales
scheme similar to that of Dare to Be Great were securities. The
promoter desired to open a retail store selling merchandise only to

possessors of special authorization cards. Each investor (foundermember) in the enterprise was to receive a commission on future retail
sales to persons to whom that founder-member had given authorization
cards. In addition, the investor was to receive a fee for recruiting others

into the organization.44
The State urged a liberal interpretation of the Howey test and
contended that the efforts expected of the investors were minimal in

nature and that "the founders are substantially dependent upon the
management of the corporation for a successful return on their invest"E.g., Berman v. Dean Witter & Co., 353 F. Supp. 669 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (investment contract; broker was to make all investment decisions); Berman v. Orimex Trading, Inc., 291 F. Supp.
701 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (no investment contract; plaintiff was to make investment decisions).
"'E.g., Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (no
investment contract; investor realized success of business depended on his own efforts); Huberman
v. Denny's Restaurants, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (investment contract; purchase
agreement for property included provision that the rent paid by the lessee, in whose operation
investor did not participate, was to be determined in part from lessee's profits).
"E.g., Kemmerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1971) (investment contract; defendants
provided everything necessary to profit); Continental Marketing Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th
Cir. 1967). cert. denied, 391 U.S. 905 (1968) (investment contract; after buying beaver and paying
ranching fee, investor did nothing more).
"E.g., Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969) (no investment
contract; both agreement and brochure demonstrated that scheme relied on efforts of the investor);
United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964) (investment contract; profit was anticipated
whether investors participated actively or inactively).
"252 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971).
"The Hawaii Market Center and Dare-type plans are both discussed by the Securities Exchange Commission under the topic "Multilevel Distributorships." SEC Securities Act of 1933
Release No. 5211, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 3387 (November 24, 1971),
reproducedin 1971-72 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,446 [hereinafter cited as SEC Release].
"52 Hawaii at 643-44, 485 P.2d a't
107. To become a founder-member at the distributor level,
the investor executed a founder-member contract and purchased for $320.00 merchandise with a
wholesale value of $70.00. To enter the organization at the supervisor level, the investor executed
the contract, and purchased for $820.00 merchandise with a wholesale value of $140.00. A supervisor earned higher fees and commissions than a distributor and also received override commissions
when his distributors were successful. Id.
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ment. ''1 5 The court, however, declined to base its decision on the Howey
test opining that Howey had "led courts to analyse investment projects
' 4
mechanically, based on a narrow concept of investor participation
rather than on a sounder concept focusing on the economic realities of
a security.47 The court determined that the basic economic reality of a
security was the "subjection of the investor's money to the risks of an
enterprise over which he exercises no managerial control."48
Following this basic precept, the court posited a new definition,
saying:
[A]n investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the
enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial value,
will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the enterprise,
and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise."
The court viewed the initial value as being subjected to the risks of
the enterprise" for two reasons. First, the recruitment fee was based
11Id. at 646, 485 P.2d at 108. This is the general approach aavocated in SEC Release.
1S52 Hawaii at 647, 485 P.2d at 108.
"7Id., 485 P.2d at 109.
"Id. at 648, 485 P.2d at 109. This concept was advanced by Professor Coffey. See Coffey,
supra note 5, at 412.
1152 Hawaii at 649, 485 P.2d at 109. As the court acknowledges, this new test is essentially
the same as that proposed by Professor Coffey. Id. at 648 n.5, 485 P.2d at 109 n.5; see Coffey,
supra note 5, at 377. There are two principle distinctions. First, Professor Coffey delineates the
various ways in which the investor's initial value can be subjected to the risks of the enterprise,
i.e., proprietary interest in the enterprise; creditor's claims against the enterprise; recommittal of
property to use or control by the enterprise; value paid in recognition of anticipated, but, as yet
unrealized, success of the enterprise; and a conditional right to receive payments. Id. at 377, 38496. Secondly, while the court emphasizes "the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise," 52 Hawaii at 648-49, 651-52, 485 P.2d at 109, III,
Professor Coffey characterizes investor participation as follows: "[A]t the time of the transaction,
the buyer is not familiar with the operations of the enterprise or does not receive the right to
participate in the management of the enterprise." Coffey, supra note 5, at 377.
"The leading case advocating this risk analysis to the question of security vel non is Silver
Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). Silver
Hills involved the sale of memberships in a nascent country club. The memberships granted the
purchaser and his immediate family the use of club facilities, but no right "in the income or assets
of the club." Id. at 813, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187. Justice Traynor, in finding a security,
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largely on the ability of the promoter to convince prospective founder-

members of the probable success of the venture.-' Secondly, noting that
the organization membership was limited to five thousand persons and,

also, that memberships would increase geometrically, the court reasoned, "[A] very large percentage of founder-members [would] be totally dependent on sales commissions to recover their initial investment
plus income. ' 52 The fact that the ind.cements leading to the investments
were based on fixed returns rather than a share in profits was termed

irrelevant. The court indicated that "[t]he unwary investor lured by
promises of fixed fees deserves the same protection as a participant in

a profit sharing plan." 53
Finally, investor participation in Hawaii Market Center was seen

as being minor and certainly not rising to the required level of managerial control. 4 The reason for requiring practical and actual control was

that such control would have given the investor the ability and opportunity to safeguard his investment "thus obviating the need for state inter-

vention.

'5 .

Though the Glenn Turner case does change the traditional test for
an investment contract, it seems, nevertheless, to adhere closely to the

avowed policies underlying judicial interpretation of the federal securities laws. " This confluence is clearly shown by contrasting Glenn Turner
with SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,Inc., in which, on facts parallelling
focused on protection for those who risk their capital "in legitimate ventures whether or not they
expect a return on their capital in one form or another." Id. at 815, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal.
Rptr. at 188.
1152 Hawaii at 650, 485 P.2d at 110.
52Id.
111d. at 651, 485 P.2d at 110. The Securities Exchange Commission advocates basically the
same position, saying, "Nor is it significant that the return promised for the use of an investor's
money may be something other than a share of the profits of the enterprise." SEC Release at
80,975; cf. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); see
text accompanying notes 78-83 infra.
Again, the SEC is in substantial agreement with the
1152 Hawaii at 651-52, 485 P.2d at 11l.
Hawaiian court. The Commission believes that investor efforts, though financially significant and
contributing to the enterprise's success, may nevertheless be irrelevant "if the investor does not
control the use of his funds to a significant degree." SEC Release at 80,975. Furthermore, the SEC
construes the reference to "efforts of others" in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946),
as limited "to those types of essential managerial efforts but for which the anticipated return could
not be produced." SEC Release at 80,975.
The court adds that the focus should be "on the quality
552 Hawaii at 652, 485 P.2d at 11l.
of the participation." Id.
"These policies are discussed in the text accompanying notes 17-26 supra.
11CCH FED. SEc.L. REP. 93, 960 (N.D. Ga. April 19, 1973).
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those in Glenn Turner, a federal district court found no investment
contract. Koscot, a sister corporation of Dare to Be Great, Inc. in the

parent organization of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 3 was technically in the business of marketing a line of cosmetics. As with Dare,

however, the real attraction to investors was the potential profit to be
derived from the successful recruitment of others into the organization
through the use of high-pressure sales methods. 0

In spite of itscharacterization of the Koscot pyramid sales plan as
a "get-rich-quick scheme in the worst sense," 6 the court refused to
accept the invitation extended by the Glenn Turner case. Two distinct
bases for the adherence to the strict "solely" standard were presented:

first, the Koscot court viewed the Glenn Turner holding as "a new,
different and more expansive standard in light of

.

. binding higher

court decisions;"'" secondly, the efforts of the investors were not viewed
as token, but rather as fundamental and substantial ones without which
6' ' 2
"distributors cannot expect any money from Koscot.
The portrayal of the Glenn Turner holding as "new, different and
more expansive" presents a point of sharp distinction with the Ninth
Circuit view that the holding does not "represent any real departure
from the Supreme Court's definition of an investment contract as set
out in Howey."63 This distinction comes into clearer focus if one credits
the premise that the definition of a security should be keyed to economic

realities. 4 While the district court in Koscot made what might be interpreted as a standard reference to the remedial nature of the legislation

and the need to focus on economic realities," the Ninth Circuit and the
"Franchise Symposium, Dare to be Great, Inc.!: A Case Study of Pyramid Sales Plan
Regulation, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 676, 677, 694 n.57 (1972).
I'CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. 93,960 at 93,845. For a full explanation of the business methods
of Koscot, see Koscot Interplanetary, Inc. v. King, 452 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
ICCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 93,960 at 93,845.
"Id. at 93,846. In addition, Chief Judge Smith, in Koscot, indicated that regulation of franchises generally under the securities laws required a definite broadening in the scope of the legislation. Id. at 93,848 n.l. In Cobb v. Network Cinema Corp., 339 F. Supp. 95, 98 n.1 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (opinion by Smith, C.J.) he said that such broadening "should originate with the Congress,"
11CCH FED. SEc. L. REp.
93,960 at 93,846.
1474 F.2d at 483. One writer-feels that the Howey Court did not intend the literal meaning
to attach to the word "solely." As support, he asserts that the factual situation in Hovey happened
to provide a situation which facilitates attachment of the literal meaning and cites Blackwell v.
Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1954); Coleman, supra note
5, at 503-04; see note 76 infra.
"See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); Coffey, supra note 5, at 376-77, see
text accompanying note 26 supra.
"See. e.g., Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Wieboldt
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Oregon district court actually reasoned from these philosophical underpinnings. For instance, Judge Skopil, at the district level in Glenn
Turner, asserted that it was not clear that the Howey definition was
intended to be applied as a "litmus test," and continued,
A narrow focus on this particular locution seems anomalous for the
court has already said

. . .

that liberal and broad interpretations [of

the statutes] are required in order to carry out the intent of Congress.
From this flows the court's stress on the economic realities behind
transactions, on substance rather than form.66
The Ninth Circuit reinforces this emphasis on the substance of the
transaction and economic realities in its careful scrutiny of the efforts
required of both parties by the Dare scheme. In return for investment
of his money, his time and effort to find and induce prospects to attend
meetings, and the cost of an affluent appearance,67 the investorpurchaser receives a share in the proceeds of the selling efforts of the
Dare organization which the court views as "the sine qua non of the
scheme; those efforts are what keeps it going; those
efforts are what
68
rich.
him
make
to
is
which
money
the
produces
The Koscot court indicated that, if the efforts of the investors there
had been "token," the scheme might have fallen within the traditional
definition of an investment contract. 9 The Glenn Turner court, on the
other hand, would not find a security if the investors contributed "essential managerial efforts." 70 The controversy thus centers in the middle
ground of "fundamental and substantial efforts" not rising to the level
of control. Why does the presence of such efforts serve to remove the
transaction from the watchful eye and the swift hand of securities regulation? Traditionally, the active investor has been thought to have less
v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 256-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.,
324 F. Supp. 640, 641-42 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
11348 F. Supp. at 774; accord, Nash & Assoc., Inc. v. Lum's of Ohio, Inc., 484 F.2d 392 (6th
Cir. 1973); Lino v. City Investing Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,124 (3d Cir. Aug. 20, 1973).
17474 F.2d at 482. "The 'salesman' is . . . told that to maximize his chances of success he
should impart an aura of affluence, whether spurious or not. . . . He is told to 'fake it 'til you
make it.' .
I..."
Id. at 480.
"'Id. at 482.
11CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,960 at 93,846.
7474 F.2d at 482, 483; cf. Romney v. Richard Prows, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 313 (D. Utah 1968),
cited with approval by the Glenn Turner district court, 348 F. Supp. at 775, where a determination
of no investment contract resulted from a finding that the parties were engaged in "a joint venture,
each to contribute substantial services or capital or both in furtherance of the venture . . . the
success of which depended to an important degree upon [the investor's] services and activity in the
venture." 289 F. Supp. at 315.
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need for the protections provided by the federal securities laws since, by
virtue of his non-monetary involvement in the enterprise, he should be
in a better position than the passive investor to protect his own investment.7' This superiority, though, is only present in relation to the passive
investor. When compared to the investor who exercises essential mana-

gerial efforts, the active investor is seen as dependent on the success of
the promoter; in other words, effective control is in the promoter. 2 This
dependency or lack of effective control has been viewed
as crucial in
73
determining the existence of an investment contract.
The essential managerial.-efforts approach of the Glenn Turner

court would seem to look not at how much effort is required of the
investor, but rather at what kind of effort is required. 74 In the opinion
of some commentators this emphasis on the quality of investor participation is essential in light of the economic realities of security transac5 One commentator even indicates that, in spite of the gloss later
tions. 7"
decisions have given the Howey test, the Howey court may have intended that the analysis should be of the quality of investor participation
rather than of the amount. 7 From the standpoint of investor protection,
such a qualitative approach seems appropriate since an investor with
"1Cf. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd, 460
F.2d 666 (1972). In Mr. Steak, the franchise agreement provided that the franchisor would have
significant control over the franchisee's receipts and operations. Id. at 643-44. It was contemplated
that the franchisee "would play an active, if severely circumscribed, role in the conduct of the
restaurant." Id. at 645. The franchisee's active participation and his status as an informed investor
were factors prompting the court to a finding of no security. Id. See also Coleman, supra note 5,
at 503-04.
2
See Coffey, supra note 5, at 396; Note, 61 Gao. L.J., supra note 5, at 1279-80,
"Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. III. 1973); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 111.
App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807, cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 903 (1965); State v. Silberberg, 166 Ohio St.
101, 139 N.E.2d 342 (1956); see Long, supra note 5, at 170-74.
7
This qualitative approach bears striking similarity to a part of the definition of an investment
contract formulated in State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52 Hawaii 642, 649, 652, 485 P.2d
105, 75109, Il 1(1971); see text accompanying note 49 supra.
Goodwin, supra note 5, at 1318-19; Long, supra note 5, at 170-72; cf Note, 61 Gao. L.J,
supra note 5, at 1279-80, 1286-87.
6
See Long, supra note 5, at 144-46, where Professor Long says, "[I]f the [Hlowey] test is
followed literally, all the Howey Company would have had to do would be to require the investor
to pick a single orange." Id. at 145: In advocating lack of direct control as a factor militating for
a finding of a security, Long points out significant language in the Howey opinion, quoting as
follows: "'A common enterprise managed by respondents or third-parties with adequate personnel
and equipment is therefore essential if the investors are to achieve their paramount aim of return
on their investments. . . . Thus all the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present
here. The investor provides the capital and shares in the earnings and profits, the promoters
manage, control and operate the enterprise.'" Id. at 176 (emphasis by Long), quoting SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946).
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actual control can be "the master of his own destiny"7 thus obviating
the need for the protection provided by the federal securities laws.
Notwithstanding the appropriateness of the Glenn Turner approach, the failure of the Ninth Circuit Court to explore the possible
inadequacy of the Howey test's insistence on an expectation of profits78
warrants comment. The risk capital approach ennunciated by Justice
Traynor in Silver Hills County Club v. Sobieski 9 and amplified by State
v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.80 provides what some consider to be a
more satisfactory approach8" and one in which the controlling efforts
analysis forms a part.8" The federal courts, however, seem content to
restrict application of the risk capital analysis to those "situations where
exceptionally high risk speculative franchises are involved." 8"
The Glen Turner court's change in the traditional test is best viewed
as a step along the road to a test fully consistent with the economic
realities of a security. Although the court only went as far as the facts
presented necessitated, its analysis of investor participation should be
appreciated and its fealty to basic policy considerations commended.
DAVID

R.

FRANKSTONE

"Mitzner v. Cardet Int'l, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
" 328 U.S. at 298, 301.
"55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961); see note 50 supra.
'"52 Hawaii 642, 485 P.2d 105 (1971); see text accompanying notes 42-55 supra.
"Coffey, supra note 5, at 374-76, 395-96; Long, supra note 5, at 167-70.
"See. e.g., Wieboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 258-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The controversy in
Wieboldt involved a contract entitling the investor to operate a Simplified Business And Tax
Center. Conceding that he had no investment contract under the traditional test, Wieboldt urged
the adoption of a risk capital approach to the definition of an investment contract. Id. at 258.
Speaking to the element of control, the court said:
[Il]t is only necessary that the franchisee exercise policy-making power over his unit of
the enterprise. . . . Only franchise agreements, like those found in Turner, which give
the franchisee no meaningful control over his own enterprise (or, of course, that of the
franchisor) should be considered investment contracts within this interpretation of the
"risk capital" approach.
Id. at 260.
"Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd,
460 F.2d 666 (1972); accord, Weiboldt v. Metz, 355 F. Supp. 255, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This
limitation, perhaps, stems from a reluctance on the part of the federal courts to provide for
regulation of all franchises, see Note, 61 GEo. L.J., supra note 5, at 1287. The position that
franchises should come within the purview of the securities laws is argued by Goodwin, supra note
5, who sees a need for availability of the anti-fraud provisions (especially lOb-5) which can, with
appropriate legislation, be made available without the necessity of registration and the concomittant harrassment of the legitimate franchisor. Id. at 1321.

